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BOOK REVIEWS
Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration, by Charles Griswold. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pp. xxxvi + 242. ISBN 978-0-521-87882-1 
(hardback), ISBN 978-0-521-70351-2 (paperback). $83.99 (hardback), 
$21.99(paperback).
I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies, by Nick Smith. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2008. Pp. xi + 298. ISBN 978-0-521-86552-4 (hard-
back), ISBN 978-0-521-68423-1 (paperback). $99.00 (hardback), $24.99 
(paperback).
ROBERT C. ROBERTS, Baylor University
Both Griswold and Smith acknowledge that the concept respectively 
under examination is not susceptible of strict philosophical definition, 
though both philosophers specify a paradigm type of case, from which 
less paradigmatic cases deviate in various ways and with reference to 
which the less paradigmatic cases can be conceptually clarified. The books 
are also structurally similar. Griswold devotes the first two thirds of his 
book to analyzing individual-to-individual forgiveness, and the last third 
to political apology, an action analogous to asking for forgiveness, and 
acceptance of such apology, which is analogous to forgiving; while Smith 
devotes the first three-fifths of his book to individuals’ apologies, and the 
last two-fifths to collective apologies. Each author takes the political kind 
of case to be much more complicated and ethically problematic, as well as 
conceptually murkier, than the individual kind. With one notable excep-
tion, both books illustrate their points with abundant, excellent examples, 
both historical and (especially in Smith’s case) imagined. I will start with 
an evaluation of Griswold’s book.
The first chapter divides into two historical discussions, the first of for-
giveness in the ancient world, and the second of Joseph Butler’s account of 
forgiveness in two of his Fifteen Sermons. Griswold disagrees with Hannah 
Arendt’s claim that “the discoverer of the role of forgiveness in the realm 
of human affairs was Jesus of Nazareth.” He claims that ancient pagan 
conceptions of forgiveness existed, but offers no examples and spends 
most of the discussion of forgiveness in the ancient world showing that 
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the philosophers, notably Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, did not regard 
forgiveness as a good thing. The explanation is that they were all “perfec-
tionists” who therefore held nothing less than perfection to be really good. 
Forgiveness is a response to injury, and the perfected person cannot be, or 
almost cannot be, injured, nor does he injure; so the best human life offers 
no occasion for forgiveness. Furthermore, forgiveness, as distinguished 
from excuse or equitable clemency, would seem to be a compromise of 
strict justice; and justice certainly is a good thing. Given Griswold’s care 
in distinguishing forgiving from such neighboring concepts as excusing, 
condoning, pardoning, showing mercy, and compassion, when he claims 
that forgiveness is a notion current in ancient paganism, he must be using 
the word carefully. It would have been helpful to have some examples.
The second chapter, “Forgiveness at Its Best,” expounds what Griswold 
takes to be forgiveness in the paradigm case. He has told us, in chapter 1, 
that he is going to treat forgiveness as a virtue, and that he means “virtue” 
to have the sense it has in Aristotle. This would seem to suggest that he is 
going to treat forgiveness as a personal trait, and he comments that a more 
precise term for the trait would be “forgivingness,” where forgiveness “is 
what a forgiving person’s virtue of forgivingness gives rise to” (p. 17; see 
also pp. 72, 92, 130).
The distinction between forgiveness as a process, transaction, exchange, 
or action, on the one hand, and forgivingness as a virtue on the other, 
seems to me a useful one that might even enter into the resolution of some 
of the puzzles that arise in connection with forgiveness. Griswold briefly 
discusses this distinction, saying, “the admirable trait of being disposed 
to forgiveness (in the right way, on the right occasion, and such, as deter-
mined by practical reason)—the quality predicated of a forgiving person’s 
character—is ‘forgivingness,’ on analogy, say, with ‘courageousness’” 
(ibid.). The analogy seems odd, since not “courageousness,” but “cour-
age,” is the usual word for the trait. And while there is a verb “to forgive” 
to go with the adjective “forgiving” and the trait name “forgivingness,” 
there is no verb “to cour” to go with the adjective “courageous” and the 
trait name “courage.” To get a verb, one needs a phrase formed from the 
adjective or the noun, such as “act courageously” or “perform an act of 
courage.” In the case of courage, then, the virtue seems to have linguistic 
primacy, while in the case of forgiveness, the action, process, response, 
exchange, attitude, or whatever forgiveness is, gets linguistic priority, and 
for the virtue one needs some such expression as “being a forgiving per-
son” or the rather quaint “forgivingness.” I should think that nobody in 
modern English thinks that “forgiveness” names a virtue—which is not to 
deny that many people think forgiveness virtuous.
An instructive analogy is Aristotle’s comment on friendship at the be-
ginning of NE book 8. In the second sentence he says, “For friendship is a 
virtue,” and then qualifies himself, “or like a virtue” (met’ aretês). Friend-
ship is not really a virtue, Aristotle seems to be saying, not a trait that 
an individual may have, but a kind of ongoing relationship between two 
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persons that requires virtues. In resemblance to virtues, forgiveness can 
perhaps be a state of a person—the state of having forgiven an offender, 
or of having been forgiven by one’s victim. But forgiveness as a state is a 
state of relationship between one person and another, and not a trait of 
individual character. As a necessarily dispositional relationship, friend-
ship is more like a virtue than is what we often call forgiveness, which has 
more the character of a process or event or action or transaction. Griswold 
himself attests to this fact, for despite saying that he is expounding for-
giveness as a virtue (pp. 17, 31, 47, 49, 130), he characterizes it variously 
as an ethical response (p. 39), a process (pp. 48, 98, 212), an act or action 
(p. 50), an exchange (p. 53n12), a communicative or bilateral act (p. 64), a 
“reciprocal moral exchange” (p. 127), and a “dyadic exchange” (p. 140). 
When he calls it the “end result” [of a process] (p. 98), something that can 
be perfectly (or imperfectly) “accomplished” (pp. 113–117), he seems to be 
classifying it as what I above called a “state.” In this last case, the half of 
the state on the victim’s side would be the victim’s dispositional attitude 
toward the wrongdoer and will be more closely analogous to friendship 
and virtue. But it still wouldn’t be the trait of being (more generally) a 
forgiving person. Below I will propose that forgiveness is, most basically, 
such an attitude.
I think we see two strands in Griswold’s discussion of forgiveness as a 
“virtue,” which sit uneasily together: on the one hand, he acknowledges 
the difference between forgivingness as a virtue and forgiveness as a pos-
sible exemplification of the virtue in an act or process of forgiving, but he 
hardly discusses forgivingness as a trait; instead, on the other hand, the 
first two-thirds of his book is about a transaction or moral exchange that 
he calls forgiveness, but he persists in calling it a virtue. One suspects that 
in the latter kind of case, “virtue” does not have the sense of excellent 
personal trait, as in Aristotle, but simply means something morally good. 
That is what the ancient philosophers denied, and what Griswold affirms.
“Forgiveness at Its Best,” then, is about the structure of a paradigm 
case of the moral transaction that Griswold calls forgiveness. “. . . forgive-
ness is fundamentally an interpersonal process whose success requires 
actions from both parties” (p. 212). Forgiveness is not a “gift” that a victim 
of moral injury bestows on the perpetrator of the injury, but a transaction 
or exchange between the two persons requiring each of them to fulfill 
certain conditions.
The core of Griswold’s presentation of the “virtue” of forgiveness is 
the specification of thirteen conditions that must be met in the paradigm 
case. Forgiveness is a two-party transaction, and each of the parties must 
meet six conditions. The thirteenth condition is that the offense must be 
forgivable.
Conditions the offender must meet are:
Take responsibility for the wrong
Repudiate her action as wrong
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Experience and express regret for the action
Commit herself to “becoming the sort of person who does not inflict injury” 
and show this commitment in deeds as well as words
Show that she understands, from the victim’s perspective, the damage she 
has done
Present a narrative of the wrong, of herself as agent of the wrong, and of her 
resolve to change, that shows the victim a way of reframing her that war-
rants his granting her forgiveness (pp. 49–51)
Conditions the victim must meet are:
Forswear revenge
Moderate his resentment
Commit to letting the resentment go altogether
Change his belief that the wrongdoer is simply a “bad person”
Drop any presumption of his moral superiority to the wrong-doer, or that 
his own identity is defined as someone injured by the wrong-doer
Address the wrongdoer and declare that he grants her forgiveness (pp. 54–58)
It seems to me that Griswold’s analysis of forgiveness would be im-
proved by some clear and systematic distinctions between and among (1) 
forgiveness as an act and (2) as a state (on the part of the offender, forgive-
ness as a state is the state of being forgiven, which is not a psychologi-
cal state; on the part of the victim, forgiveness as a state is psychological, 
namely an attitude toward the offender), (3) the ideal dyadic exchange 
between victim and offender, which we might call the repentance- 
forgiveness exchange, (4) forgivingness as the trait of character that dis-
poses its possessor to forgiveness as an act or state, and (5) forgiveness as 
a cultural institution.
Following these distinctions, forgiveness itself (as we might call it) 
would be roughly captured by the conditions that Griswold says the vic­
tim must meet. The victim is the one who “does” the forgiving (just as, 
alternatively, he might be the one who excuses, condones, takes revenge, 
feeds on his resentment, or demonizes his offender). By no stretch of Eng-
lish is what the offender contributes to the interaction forgiveness. In the 
ideal dyadic exchange, the offender contributes repentance. So forgive-
ness is clearly distinct from the ideal dyadic transaction that consists of 
the interaction of the offender’s contrition with the victim’s forgiveness.
Forgiveness “itself” (as we might say) is most fundamentally an attitude 
of a victim toward the offender, in light of the offense. The attitude is be-
nevolent rather than vengeful towards the offender, despite clear recogni-
tion of the negative moral status of the offense. Thus it is an attitude that 
presupposes an appreciation of the moral wrongness of the offense. (One 
can be a forgiver only if one has a sense of justice.)
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Forgiveness as an attitude is distinct from forgiveness as an act of com-
municating one’s attitude to the offender. Often, forgiveness as an attitude 
precedes the victim’s act of communicating his attitude to the offender—
of “offering” or explicitly conferring forgiveness. In other cases, the act 
of conferring forgiveness is an important part of the process of moving 
towards a forgiving attitude.
On p. 64 Griswold criticizes unconditional forgiveness, saying, “as a 
communicative or bilateral act, ‘forgiveness’ that requires nothing of the 
offender  . . . does communicate to her, as well as to everyone else, that she 
is not being held accountable.” But if we distinguish between forgiveness 
as an attitude and the act of communicating that attitude to the offender, 
then it would not follow that forgiveness communicates anything at all. 
One might forgive and remain completely silent about it, if that seemed 
the wise course. And perhaps it would be the wise course, in case the of-
fender would take the communication as condoning her delinquency. But, 
contrary to Griswold’s claim, that is not the only kind of case. Sometimes 
a pre-emptive communication of forgiveness (either in explicit words, or 
in demeanor) elicits repentance. To me it makes more sense to talk of ac-
tions or attitudes of the offender as conditions warranting the communi­
cation of forgiveness, rather than as warranting forgiveness itself. And 
such warrants are not universally required, but required in only some of 
the cases, as practical wisdom must be left to adjudicate. (Forgiveness as 
communication of forgiveness is one sense of “act of forgiveness”; another 
is forgiveness as the resolution or effort or undertaking to take, or begin to 
take, a forgiving attitude.)
One factor influencing the offender’s construal of the victim’s commu-
nication of forgiveness is the offender’s knowledge or sense of the vic-
tim’s moral character. If the victim has the virtue of forgivingness, then 
the offender’s knowledge may include that the victim is nobody’s fool or 
doormat, that she has strong self-respect, a strong sense of justice, and is 
likely to appreciate better than the offender the moral significance of the 
offender’s offense. (Without a strong sense of justice, a person does not 
have the virtue of forgivingness; that is what keeps her from being a con-
doner.) Here we see the relevance of the definite concept of virtue, and of 
forgivingness in particular, to the ideal dyadic exchange.
Thus, I would distinguish the victim’s forgiveness of the offender from 
the victim’s character trait of readiness or disposition to forgive offend-
ers. Forgivingness is an affective/cognitive constitution of personality or 
character trait that amounts to a readiness or disposition and capacity to 
forgive. Perhaps paradig matically, but not necessarily, forgiveness would 
be a response to the offender’s meeting some or all of the conditions that 
Griswold requires of her. The conditions that Griswold thinks the offend-
er must satisfy are some of the points of sensitivity of the forgiving person; 
they are the kinds of considerations that a forgiving person finds espe-
cially compelling. Forgivingness will involve a set of deeply appropriated 
moral and/or theological concepts and a set of collateral virtues (justice, 
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humility, compassion, generosity, self-control, practical wisdom). It will 
be the result of moral education within a worldview. Griswold points out 
that forgiveness belongs in moral outlooks that acknowledge the ongoing 
imperfection of human beings in a world fraught with injustices (p. 113), 
and that Christianity is one such outlook. He points out the lack of fit 
between forgiveness and most if not all of the moral outlooks represent-
ed by the ancient philosophers. Griswold explicitly eschews discussion 
of theological matters, but looking at the more particular ways in which 
people belonging to a moral outlook understand themselves, their human 
fellows, and the nature of the universe (including a conception of God, if 
any) would be required for a fine-grained understanding of the virtue of 
forgivingness. The cognitive-affective structure of virtues will vary with 
such world-view differences.
We could also help fully distinguish an institution or practice of for-
giveness, which would be something like Griswold’s paradigm scenario 
functioning as a set of guidelines governing procedure in cases of inter-
personal moral injury, but would also include the moral and religious 
beliefs that make sense of the procedure. Christians have a theology of 
forgiveness, including such doctrines as the fallenness of human nature, 
the love and forgiving nature of God as well as his capacity for wrath, the 
redeeming power of the cross of Christ, and the commandment that we 
should forgive one another as God has forgiven us. A secular philosophy 
of forgiveness will include a doctrine of morally flawed human nature, 
and perhaps a utilitarian justification for the practice, in light of flawed 
human nature and the devastating consequences typical of unmitigated 
anger and cycles of revenge.
The notion of forgiveness as an institution could help with deciding 
whether forgiveness existed in ancient paganism. We might allow that 
Achilles’ compassionate relaxation of his anger at the house of Priam and 
his grant ing of Priam’s wish to give his son Hector a fitting funeral (Ili­
ad 24) is an instance of ancient pagan forgiveness (Griswold says it isn’t, 
77), while holding that the institution of forgiveness arose first with the 
teaching and life of Jesus of Nazareth. Even in the Old Testament, the few 
instances of inter-human forgiveness (Esau of Jacob [Genesis 33], Joseph 
of his brothers [Genesis 45]) are far less in doubt than that there was an 
institution of inter-human forgiveness. The ancient Hebrew world-view 
was hospitable to a concept of forgiveness in ways that Greek philosophy 
was not; but conceptual readiness for a practice is not the same as actually 
having it.
Forgiveness as an attitude excludes anger and resentment towards the 
offender, but I don’t think it is necessary that there be a stage at which the 
victim felt anger or resentment, and then another stage at which he over-
came it or got over it. This may be the typical scenario, but it is not the only 
one, and the forgiveness may be all the more impressive morally if the 
victim does not get angry at the offense. When the boy Ilyusha unjustly 
bites Alyosha Karamazov’s finger to the bone, Alyosha does not react in 
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anger, but in compassion for the boy, whom he supposes to be suffering 
in some way unknown to Alyosha. We are justified in thinking Alyosha 
forgives Ilyusha, rather than condones or excuses, because we know he 
recognizes that he has been injured, appreciates the moral gravity of the 
injury, and yet is not vindic tive but benevolent toward the malefactor. 
And part of our reason for thinking so is our knowledge of his character. 
By this time in the story we know Alyosha well enough to read the sce-
nario as depicting a forgiving attitude rather than abject condoning or ex-
culpatory excusing. He does not undergo a process of forgiveness, and he 
does not perform an act of forgiveness, either of declaring his forgiveness 
of Ilyusha or of actively renouncing anger and revenge; but he does take a 
forgiving attitude toward the boy.
Griswold’s third chapter, entitled “Imperfect Forgiveness,” is devoted 
to cases in which the interpersonal exchange that Griswold calls forgive-
ness fails to meet some of the thirteen conditions. The main deviant types 
are third-party forgiveness, unilateral forgiveness, and self-forgiveness. I 
will comment on the first two of these.
In third-party forgiveness, someone other than the victim forgives the 
offender, thus violating an apparent rule that only the victim has standing 
to forgive. Although Griswold does not make standing a distinct condi-
tion for the victim to forgive the offender, the condition seems implicit in 
his status as victim and the justness of his resentment. The need to make 
room for third-party forgiveness arises from cases in which the offender 
has fulfilled all the repentance-conditions, but the victim has died with-
out forgiving, or simply refuses to forgive. On a Christian understanding, 
the counterintuitiveness of this situation is considerably mitigated by the 
fact that God, as the primary victim in every case, always has standing to 
forgive (though it is still sad not to have been forgiven by one’s human 
victim, if one is deeply repentant). Griswold’s secular solution is to give 
a kind of secondary standing to a third party who is justifiably indignant 
about the wrong and sufficiently identified with the victim through car-
ing for her and knowing her, as well as knowing about the offender’s of-
fense and repentance (p. 119). But to legitimate his standing in as proxy- 
forgiver, the third party must have some historical justification for think-
ing that, under different circumstances, the victim would have been will-
ing to grant forgiveness.
I think we can see how a clear conception of forgivingness, as distinct 
from forgiving, is also relevant to third-party “forgiveness.” Even if the 
third party is not qualified to forgive the offense in the sense of confer-
ring or pronouncing forgiveness, as a forgiving person he will still have 
an attitude towards the offender, in light of the offense, that has much in 
common with forgiveness. He will value and sympathetically understand 
the offender’s repentance and desire for forgiveness; he will appreciate his 
own moral fallibility in matters like that of the offense. His own indigna-
tion at the offender will be mitigated by compassion, and by the offend-
er’s repentance. This compassionate moral understanding by an involved 
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third party can have much the same effect on the offender’s conscience as 
forgiveness proper might have.
By now it should be clear that I do not think that unilateral forgiveness 
is necessarily an imperfect kind of forgiveness. If we distinguish forgive-
ness from repentance, and from the ideal dyadic transaction of which for-
giveness is one side, then forgiveness can be complete as forgiveness with-
out the repentance of the offender, though of course in that case it has not 
been properly received by the offender, and has not been “completed” in the 
restoration of mutual good will, which I suppose to be the ultimate telos 
of forgiveness.
In the last third of his book, Griswold argues that forgiveness as he has 
expounded it is not applicable in political contexts, though there is place 
for a related transaction, that of political apology and its acceptance by 
the injured entity. Governments and other institutions apologize but do 
not properly ask forgiveness, and accept apologies but do not forgive. Po-
litical apology resembles the repentance-forgiveness exchange in suppos-
ing that a wrong has been done by some identifiable agent who can take 
responsibility for it and is not asking for mercy or clemency or that the 
wrong be forgotten, and that the success of the apology depends on truth-
fully stating the facts of the wrong. Still, political apology is not a request 
for forgiveness, and the acceptance of such apology is not forgiveness, for 
several reasons: (1) There are too many players, with too diverse agen-
das and points of view, on both sides of the interaction; the forgiveness 
exchange requires integrated personal agents on both sides. (2) This com-
plexity makes it difficult and urgent to control the possible consequences 
of apologies, of which there are many such as legal liability and loss or 
gain of power, and which are not characteristic factors in cases of repen-
tance and forgiveness. (3) Political apologies are delivered and accepted 
by representatives rather than by the actual wrongdoer and the actual vic-
tim, and thus bear a resemblance to third-party forgiveness transactions 
and have a symbolic character absent from forgiveness exchanges. (4) No 
particular sentiments analogous to contrition and resentment are required 
for successful political apologies.
Griswold usefully discusses several historical examples of public apol-
ogy, including the University of Alabama’s apology to the descendents 
of American slaves for the university’s prospering from slavery, the U.S. 
Government’s apology to Japanese Americans for interning them during 
WW II, Desmond Tutu’s pronouncing forgiveness on the South African 
Dutch Reformed Church in response to a repentant plea by its representa-
tive for its complicity in apartheid, and King Hussein’s apology to the par-
ents of some Israeli girls murdered by a berserk Jordanian soldier. He also 
looks at two cases of culpable failure to apologize: Robert McNamara’s 
for the mishandling of the Viet Nam War, and Richard Nixon’s for the 
Watergate cover-up.
The last substantive chapter in the book is a meditation on the Viet-
nam War Memorial on the Mall in Washington, D.C. Griswold admires 
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the Memorial as architecturally brilliant but faults it morally, because it 
avoids the honest recognition of the injustice of the war that a public apol-
ogy would have embodied. Instead, the Memorial invites reflection about 
the justice of the war, while honoring the courage of those who fought in 
it. Griswold detects in this evaluative compromise an untenable effort to 
separate the virtues. “Courage in the service of wrong is not a virtue, and 
thus no longer courage proper . . . . Would one call a child molester ‘cou-
rageous’ in light of his persisting in his activities at great personal risk?” 
(p. 208). An implication of Griswold’s position here would seem to be that 
no acts of courage can have been performed in the course of the Viet Nam 
War. This seems to me an intolerable implication that casts doubt on Gris-
wold’s way of conceiving the inseparability of the virtues. At a minimum 
we should distinguish courageous but unjust actions performed by per-
sons who are aware of the injustice they are doing from ones who believe 
their actions to be just. But I am inclined to think that even actions per-
formed by people who know them to be unjust may satisfy the conditions 
for being courageous. Courage need not be conceived as a “moral” virtue 
in the same way that justice and compassion are.
Nick Smith is a legal theorist, and his present book is a prolegomenon 
to a projected volume on apologies in the law. He writes in a lively fashion 
with engaging and sometimes amusing examples that compensate some-
what for his long wind and repetitions. He tries to maintain a healthy 
balance between, on the one hand, individual responsibility for wrongdo-
ing and the importance of authentic contrition in apologizing and, on the 
other, the effect of institutional structures and the importance of prag-
matic considerations in the pursuit of public wellbeing. In this I think he 
succeeds. He has a cursory chapter on the relation of apologies to forgive-
ness, but forgiveness is not a major concern of the book. He does not, to 
my memory, use the word “virtue.”
To Griswold’s paradigm of forgiveness corresponds Smith’s categori-
cal apology, thus the most thoroughly and purely apologetic kind of apol-
ogy, “the most robust, painstaking, and formal of the varieties” (p. 140). 
Smithian categorical apology is unlike Griswoldian forgiveness in not be-
ing an exchange or transaction between offender and victim, but belongs 
decisively on the side of the offender; it is a “gesture” (p. 24) or a “ritual” 
(p. 26), perhaps a performance, directed at the victim. The categorical 
apology has the following twelve properties: The offender (1) states and 
corroborates the facts of the delinquency in question, rather than vaguely 
characterizing them (“I was wrong”); (2) declares that he is causally re-
sponsible for the offense and to be blamed for it (not just expressing regret 
at the offense or sympathy with the victim); (3) has standing to apologize 
for the harm; (4) distinguishes and identifies clearly each of the harms 
for which he is blameworthy (not, for example, apologizing merely for 
one of the minor harms he caused); (5) identifies the moral principles that 
his delinquency violates; (6) endorses those principles, presumably in 
agreement with the victim; (7) acknowledges the victim’s status as moral 
BOOK REVIEWS 239
interlocutor with full human agency and dignity; (8) regrets his action or 
inaction “categorically,” that is, not merely as a bad consequence of an 
appropriate action (“I am sorry that I dropped an atomic bomb on your 
country but it was the best available option”), but as an action that he 
now thoroughly repudiates; (9) articulates (communicates) 1–2, 4–8 to the 
victim; 10) reforms his life so as not to offend again in the way apologized 
for, again and again demonstrates his commitment to reform, accepts ap-
propriate sanctions for his wrongdoing, and redresses the injury as far as 
he reasonably can; (11) intends his apology to serve not merely his own 
interests, but the wellbeing of the victim and the vindication of relevant 
values; (12) feels appropriate emotions, for example, guilt about his delin-
quency and sympathy for the victim.
Much of the burden of Smith’s book is to show how far many (most) 
apologies fall short of being real apologies, by apologizing vaguely or 
about the wrong wrong, by not really taking responsibility, by express-
ing only sympathy or conditional regret, by only expressing agreement 
on the moral principles involved, or by not really intending to act differ-
ently in the future. Apologies are often deceitful, being efforts to convey 
“meaning” they do not actually have so as to avoid responsibility or the 
consequences of irresponsible behavior. Smith’s book aims to make this 
eventuality less likely in the reader’s case. Among non-categorical kinds 
of apologies, Smith discusses the Ambiguous Apology, Expression of 
Sympathy, the Value-Declaring Apology, the Conciliatory Apology, the 
Compensatory Apology, the Purely Instrumental Apology, the Coerced 
Apology, and the Proxy Apology.
Free Will: Sourcehood and Its Alternatives, by Kevin Timpe. London: Con-
tinuum, 2008. Pp. 155. $130.00 (hardcover).
NEAL A. TOGNAZZINI, The College of William and Mary
The problem of free will is one of those philosophical problems—perhaps 
they are all like this—that rewards those who take the time to revisit the 
basics. It is for this reason that I am always glad to see books like Kevin 
Timpe’s Free Will: Sourcehood and Its Alternatives, which for the most part en-
deavors to furnish the last fifty years of debate over free will with a new and 
useful perspective. Timpe thus adds his own voice to the mix not only by ar-
guing for a particular view about free will but also by simply telling its story.
Timpe’s book is very readable and he displays an impressive command 
of what has become an almost unmanageably large literature. Indeed, 
Timpe tells his story so that, for the most part, readers need not have any 
background in free will (though I would wager that newcomers to the is-
sues will nevertheless occasionally get lost in the intricate thicket that the 
Frankfurt-style counterexamples have become). The book’s conclusion is 
